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INTRODUCTION
In order to make sense of any sort of comparison, there must ordinarily be some degree of similarity among the things that are to be
compared. In comparative constitutional law, for example, it seems
clear that a basic similarity in underlying principles—a common acceptance of what German constitutional law calls the “free democratic
basic order”—is a fundamental presupposition of most contemporary
endeavors in the area.
Yet it is not the similarities, but rather the differences, that lend
these endeavors their special piquancy and much of their value. More
specifically, it is the myriad differences, set out against the background of common agreement, that often make these comparisons
worthwhile—because the differences represent alternative means that
have been chosen in various systems to pursue what is essentially a
common end. In any event, the differences are ubiquitous: the more
deeply one probes into an issue in comparative constitutional law, the
more evident it becomes that almost nothing is precisely the same in
any two legal systems.
Certainly a comparison of the respective roles of the Chief Justice
of the United States and the President of the Federal Constitutional
Court of Germany requires us to consider two systems whose underlying presuppositions are in many ways quite similar. In general principle, moreover, the functions of the official leaders of these two eminent tribunals are also in many respects the same.
But that is indeed where the similarities end—in general principles. When we examine the actual institutions themselves—the Supreme Court of the United States and the Constitutional Court of the
Federal Republic of Germany—we see that, in many aspects of ex-
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tremely important detail, there are very wide differences between the
institutional structures and functions of these two important constitutional courts. Moreover, as the institutional aspects of these two
courts differ, these differences result in quite substantial variations between the roles of the two chief judicial officers: the Chief Justice of
the United States and the President of the German Constitutional
Court.
But it is also clear that no constitutional or statutory drafter ever
focused in the first instance on the design of the chief judicial officers
of these two constitutional courts. Rather, the principal focus was on
the design of the respective tribunals as institutions, and, in many respects, the salient characteristics and relative power of the chief judicial officers have followed rather logically from differences in the basic design of the two institutions.
It is, of course, not the place here to engage in an extended disquisition on the Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany—although many readers may not be immediately familiar with
this institution. Suffice it to say that the Constitutional Court was established after World War II to interpret and enforce the Basic Law
(constitution) of the Federal Republic of Germany and that, in the
more than five decades of its existence, the Court has developed an
extensive constitutional jurisprudence of considerable subtlety and
1
power. While most of the Court’s decisions are handed down in procedures that—roughly speaking—resemble the concrete “cases” and
“controversies” of American constitutional law, the Court’s jurisdiction also includes certain “abstract” proceedings initiated by a state or
by one-third of the members of parliament, or by one “constitutional
organ” claiming that another “organ” has invaded its sphere of com2
petence. A number of other differences between the two courts—
specifically relevant to our topic—will be touched upon in the paragraphs below.
So let us begin with the differences between the Chief Justice of
the United States and the President of the German Constitutional
Court—differences that grow out of variations in the respective judicial institutions themselves. As we proceed with this examination, a

1

For comprehensive works in English on the jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court, see DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (2d ed. 1997); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (1994).
2
Grundgesetz [GG] [Constitution] art. 93, §1, cls. 1-2, available at http://
dejure.org/gesetze/GG (last visited Apr. 20, 2006).
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number of important similarities between the two offices will also become apparent.
I. TWO SEPARATE PANELS
In a number of significant instances, the institutional structure of
the German Constitutional Court seems to accord the Court’s President distinctly less power than that exercised by the Chief Justice of
the United States. One crucial difference, for example, is that the
Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany is actually
more like two courts than one—in sharp contrast with the Supreme
Court of the United States which, according to the constitutional text,
3
must consist of “one Supreme Court.”
As part of a political compromise entered into when the German
Constitutional Court was established in 1951, parliament decided that
the Court should be divided into two separate panels or “Senates.” At
the outset, each panel consisted of twelve justices, but since 1962 that
4
number has been set at eight justices for each Senate.
The work of the Court is divided between the two Senates according to the subject matter of the particular case. Thus, with some significant exceptions, matters of individual rights come before the socalled “First Senate,” and matters of governmental structure are de5
cided by the “Second Senate.” Upon appointment, each justice is assigned to one of the two Senates and may not ordinarily participate in
the work of the other Senate. Although the two Senates are authorized to sit together in certain circumstances (in a body called the Ple6
num), this joint meeting does not take place very frequently. The re3

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
The German Basic Law does not actually require that the Constitutional Court
be divided into two Senates. Like the Constitution of the United States, the Basic Law
provides only a few guidelines for the structure and nature of its highest constitutional
tribunal. As a result, most decisions concerning the Court’s size, structure, and operation were left to legislative decision. See GG arts. 93-94. Thus, as the Judiciary Act of
1789 filled in many of the details relating to the Supreme Court of the United States,
the so-called “Constitutional Court Act” of 1951 (as amended) provides most of the
details concerning the characteristics of the German Constitutional Court. See Gesetz
über das Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGG] [Federal Constitutional Court Act],
Aug. 11, 1993, BGBl. I at 1473, last amended on Dec. 15, 2004, BGBl. I at 3396, 3403;
DONALD P. KOMMERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN WEST GERMANY 86-87 (1976); UWE WESEL,
DER GANG NACH KARLSRUHE 38-42 (2004).
5
In order to equalize the workload, a limited number of individual rights issues
have been shifted into the jurisdiction of the Second Senate.
6
See, e.g., BVerfGG § 16 (conferring jurisdiction on the Plenum to resolve inconsistencies between constitutional views of the two Senates).
4
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sult is, therefore, that the two Senates of the Constitutional Court in
7
effect constitute two different courts.
The President of the Constitutional Court is the presiding officer
of only one of the two Senates: the presiding officer of the other Senate is an entirely different judge, who is called the Vice President of
the Court. (Of the eight Presidents of the German Constitutional
Court from 1951 to the present, six have been the presiding officer of
the First Senate, and two have been the presiding officer of the Sec8
ond Senate.) As a result, any possible special influence that the
President might wield—as President—in the conferences and certain
other inner workings of the Court, relating to the actual decision of
cases, is likely to be restricted to one Senate alone. The Vice President may have this power—or something like it—in the other Senate.
Therefore, one could argue that there are two “Presidents” of the
Constitutional Court, although I think it is fair to say that the actual
“President” does wield a degree of unique moral and practical authority, as will be discussed further below.
II. TWELVE-YEAR NONRENEWABLE TERMS
Another difference of considerable importance—which also may
diminish the comparative authority of the President of the German
Court—arises from differing rules relating to the tenure of office of
the judges. While the Justices of the American Supreme Court, including the Chief Justice, are in effect chosen for life, the judges of
the German Constitutional Court (including the President and Vice
9
President) are appointed for nonrenewable twelve-year terms. This
7

KOMMERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS, supra note 4, at 86.
See VERFASSUNGSRECHTSPRECHUNG 665-75 (Jörg Menzel ed., 2000) (listing the
judges of the Constitutional Court).
9
BVerfGG § 4(1). This rule, which is of statutory rather than constitutional origin, has been in effect since 1970. At an earlier period, some judges enjoyed unlimited
terms (up to the mandatory retirement age), while other judges were appointed to renewable eight-year terms. KOMMERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS, supra note 4, at 88.
The judges of the Constitutional Court are chosen in the following manner: half
of the judges are elected by the Bundesrat (the upper house of the German parliament, which represents the states), and half of the judges are chosen by a committee
of the Bundestag (the popular house of parliament). BVerfGG §§ 5-6. In each case, a
two-thirds vote is necessary in order to select a Constitutional Court judge. Id. §§ 6(5),
7. This rule, which effectively eliminates the possibility that a single political party may
dictate the appointment, tends to favor judges from the center of the ideological spectrum. The Bundesrat and the Bundestag committee alternate in the choice of the
Court’s President and Vice President. Id. § 9(1). Three judges of each Senate of the
Constitutional Court must be drawn from the highest courts of the “ordinary” judici8
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choice represents an alternative method of achieving judicial independence: even though the Constitutional Court judges have limited
terms, they cannot be reappointed and therefore—the theory goes—
they would be unlikely to trim their decisions to achieve any sort of
10
political favor with executive or legislative officials.
The result of these shorter judicial terms is that there is a reduced
chance for the exercise of influence by the Constitutional Court
President over a very long period of time. One could compare, for
example, the shorter German terms with the recent example of William Rehnquist, who served for nineteen years as Chief Justice (after
fourteen years as Associate Justice). Indeed, during the period from
1951 (when the Constitutional Court was established) until the present, there have been eight Presidents of the Constitutional Court,
whereas—during the same period—there have only been five Chief
Justices of the United States (actually, only four, if one excludes the
11
tenure of newly appointed Chief Justice Roberts).
Indeed, even
more extreme disparities are readily imaginable: the period from
1801 to 1864, for example, encompassed the chief justiceships of only
two individuals, Marshall and Taney. But this period is considerably
longer than the period from 1951 to the present, which covers the entire history of the German Constitutional Court and includes therefore the entire tenure of its eight Presidents.
Thus, the limitation on terms of office furnishes another way in
which the authority of the President of the Constitutional Court may

ary. Id. § 2(3); see infra note 35 and accompanying text (reviewing the basic structure
of the “ordinary” legal system). In practice, the justices are actually chosen by secret
agreement among the political parties, and there are no public hearings on the judges’
qualifications, such as those that have become common for Supreme Court nominees
in the United States. For a discussion of proposals to limit American Supreme Court
Justices to a single nonrenewable term, see Stephen B. Burbank, Alternative Career Resolution II: Changing the Tenure of Supreme Court Justices, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1511 (2006).
10
In 1994, Roman Herzog, at the time President of the Constitutional Court, was
nominated by the conservative coalition for the (largely ceremonial, but very eminent)
office of President of the German Federal Republic. WERNER FILMER & HERIBERT
SCHWAN, ROMAN HERZOG: DIE BIOGRAPHIE 223 (1996). Thus, the eligibility of a Constitutional Court judge for an eminent high office, before or after the expiration of his
or her twelve-year term, might theoretically raise an issue of compromised independence. Of course, the same possibility arises in the United States also, as a Justice of the
Supreme Court might resign to accept another governmental position, as occurred, for
example, in the cases of Justices James Byrnes and Arthur Goldberg.
11
The American Chief Justices during this period are: Vinson, Warren, Burger,
Rehnquist, and Roberts.
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seem limited, to some extent, in comparison with that of the Chief
12
Justice of the United States.
III. LIMITED AUTHORITY OVER ASSIGNMENT OF OPINIONS
The Chief Justice of the United States has only one vote in the
Court’s conference—as does each of the other Justices. It is often
said, therefore, that much of the special power of the Chief Justice’s
role lies in his authority over the assignment of opinions written for
the Court. The Chief Justice assigns all opinions in cases in which he
votes with the majority; the senior Justice in the majority assumes that
13
function if the Chief Justice dissents from the decision. It is sometimes said that a Chief Justice has employed this authority to help cement coalitions, to improve his tactical position with various members
of the Court, and to direct opinions in important cases toward those
Justices whose views are most like his own. It has also been said that,
from time to time, a Chief Justice may even forego casting a dissenting
vote and switch to the majority side (perhaps only temporarily), in or14
der to be able to assign the opinion in an important case.
Whatever power an American Chief Justice may exercise through
this authority (and these possible maneuvers), any parallel authority is
greatly reduced in the case of the President of the Constitutional
Court of the Federal Republic of Germany. First, of course, the President of the Constitutional Court could possess such possible authority
12

Moreover, in a reflection, perhaps, of the bureaucratic nature of the German
judiciary, the judges of the Constitutional Court (including the President and Vice
President) are required to retire upon reaching the age of sixty-eight. BVerfGG §
4(3). Thus, a Constitutional Court President who is over the age of fifty-six when he or
she is appointed will ordinarily not even be allowed to serve a full period of twelve
years. Accordingly, President Jutta Limbach, who was sixty years old when she ascended to the Court, was permitted to serve for eight years only. KARIN DECKENBACH,
JUTTA LIMBACH: EINE BIOGRAFIE 173, 223 (2003); Donald P. Kommers, Jutta Limbach,
in WOMEN IN LAW: A BIO-BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SOURCEBOOK 144, 149 n.1 (Rebecca Mae
Salokar & Mary L. Volcansek eds., 1996).
On the other hand, a Constitutional Court judge whose term has expired continues in office until his or her successor has been officially chosen. BVerfGG § 4(4);
KLAUS SCHLAICH & STEFAN KORIOTH, DAS BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT 32 (6th ed.
2004). Thus the formula recently invoked by retiring Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in
the United States has long been enshrined in German statutory law. In the case of a
stalemate over the choice of a successor, a judge’s term might therefore be perceptibly
extended.
13
For a history of this practice, see G. Edward White, The Internal Powers of the Chief
Justice: The Nineteenth-Century Legacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1463, 1476-84 (2006).
14
For a discussion of voting strategy on the Court, see Paul J. Wahlbeck, Strategy
and Constraints on Supreme Court Opinion Assignment, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1729 (2006).
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with respect to only one of the two Senates—the Vice President would
have parallel authority in the other Senate. But more important, neither the President nor the Vice President actually possesses the discretionary authority to assign opinions of the Court in most instances—
even in his or her own Senate. Finally, the fact that majority opinions
in the Constitutional Court are unsigned, along with other differences, may affect the dynamics (and politics) of opinion writing in
significant ways.
To understand the full force of these points, it will be necessary to
step back for a moment and consider the nature of judicial opinions
in the Federal Constitutional Court from a more general perspective—because the differences from opinions in the Supreme Court are
significant. The first important point of difference is that in Germany,
as in most continental countries, an appellate panel’s opinion is not
signed by its individual author. Moreover, in all German courts (with
the exception of the Constitutional Court), all separate opinions—
15
that is, concurring or dissenting opinions—are prohibited. Thus in
almost all German courts the panel speaks with an impressive unanimity, even though the participating judges may have been deeply and
bitterly split on a particular issue.
Until 1970, this rule of forced unanimity prevailed in the Constitutional Court as well. Apparently some members of parliament had
wished to authorize separate opinions when the Constitutional Court
was established in 1951, but the majority was unwilling to allow this
innovation in the German legal system. In the 1960s, however, certain
opinions of the Court began to reveal that there actually were divisions on the panel—by indicating the numbers and views of the op16
posing justices, although not disclosing their names. In response to
this not so subtle judicial pressure, the parliament enacted a statute in
1970 allowing “deviating” (abweichende) opinions, which were to be
17
signed by the author. This liberalizing amendment applied to the
Federal Constitutional Court alone.
But even after the introduction of signed dissents and concurrences in 1970, the majority opinions of the German Constitutional
Court (whether or not they are accompanied by separate opinions)
remain unsigned. Yet, of course, there is a principal author of each
15

SCHLAICH & KORIOTH, supra note 12, at 39.
For a well-known example of such an opinion, see Bundesverfassungsgericht
[BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Aug. 5, 1966, 20 Entscheidungen des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 162 (F.R.G.) (Spiegel Case).
17
BVerfGG § 30 (2); SCHLAICH & KORIOTH, supra note 12, at 38-42.
16
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opinion. That author is not ordinarily chosen, however, at the discretion of the President (or Vice President) of the Constitutional Court.
Rather, the author is ordinarily chosen according to the subject matter
of the constitutional case to be decided.
The system works in the following manner: the jurisdiction of
each of the two Senates is divided into broad general subject matter
areas—such as freedom of expression, freedom of religion, eminent
domain, etc. (in the First Senate), and issues relating to the European
Union, international law, the rights and structure of parliament, etc.
(in the Second Senate). Then the subject matter areas of each Senate
are allocated in an equitable manner among the justices of the Sen18
ate. When a new justice comes to the Constitutional Court, he or
she will ordinarily assume responsibility for certain subject matter areas that are open at the time. Thus, each justice becomes an expert in
specific subject matter areas within the jurisdiction of his or her Sen19
ate. The result is, however, that when a particular case comes to the
Court, it is assigned to the justice who maintains responsibility for the
constitutional area into which the case falls.
On the other hand, there may be some overlapping of assigned
areas. Moreover, some of the cases may not fall into any of the areas
that have been specified—although even under these circumstances,
the “division of business” document may set forth detailed guidelines
for the assignment of the relevant cases. Yet in some of these procedural gray areas, the President in his or her Senate (and the Vice
President in the other Senate) may possibly retain some independent
20
discretion.
The justice who receives the assignment of a case—usually because the case falls within his or her area of expertise—is known as the
“Reporter” (Berichterstatter). The main task of the Reporter is to write
a long memorandum on the case, called a “votum,” which ordinarily
18

This “division of the business of the Court” (Geschäftsverteilung) is set out in
great detail and published each year as an official document of the Court. The
Geschäftsverteilung document for each of the last seven years may be found at the
Court’s website: http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/organisation.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2006) [hereinafter Geschäftsverteilung documents, 2000-2006].
19
Apparently, it is possible for justices to trade subject matter areas among themselves. For an example, see Reinhard Müller, Di Fabio auf Kirchhofs Spuren, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Aug. 16, 2005, at 4.
20
Geschäftsordnung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [Rules of the Federal Constitutional Court], Dec. 15, 1986, BGBl. I at 2532, § 20(2) (F.R.G.). Moreover, if the Senate agrees, the President (or Vice President) may choose an additional justice to share
the task of writing the opinion in particularly important cases. Id.; ERNST BENDA &
ECKART KLEIN, VERFASSUNGSPROZESSRECHT 65 (2d ed. 2001).

2006]

PERSPECTIVES FROM GERMANY

1861

becomes the basis for the Court’s opinion in that case. When the case
is debated in conference, however, a majority of the justices may make
any changes they choose in the opinion derived from the votum, and
neither the author of the votum nor the President has any formal influence over these changes. Of course, a particular justice may exert
significant influence on the conference by virtue of personal powers
and abilities, and that may well include the special expertise possessed
by the Reporter. Indeed, this special expertise may often give the Reporter extraordinary authority over the opinion and result—
particularly in complex cases in which a deep knowledge of the sub21
ject matter by the Reporter gives him or her a decided advantage.
Yet even in this system, which seems to deprive the President of
the Constitutional Court of the influence resulting from the independent assignment of opinions, the system may nonetheless accord a
degree of special—although informal—authority to the President. In
the period before 1970, when justices were not permitted to ventilate
their independent views by writing a separate dissenting or concurring
opinion, there apparently was substantial pressure within the internal
dynamics of the Court to reach some sort of decision that was agreeable to all. Under these circumstances, a President of the Court who
had talents as a mediator was able to exercise a special degree of authority within his or her own Senate. The first President of the Constitutional Court, Hermann Höpker-Aschoff, although not an impressive
legal technician, seemed to possess a “genius” for such mediating efforts, and his presidential role in directing the conferences of the justices gave him scope for the exercise of this influence within his own
22
Senate.
Even now, when dissenting and concurring opinions are
possible, they are actually written much less frequently in the German
Constitutional Court than they are in the Supreme Court of the
United States, and the pressures for a large number of unanimous
opinions may still be strong. Thus, it may be that a President (or Vice
21

It is often said, for example, that Professor Paul Kirchhof of Heidelberg, who
was a judge of the Second Senate from 1987 to 1999, was able to insert several of his
own distinctive constitutional and economic theories into the Court’s opinions in tax
cases, as well as in the Court’s important decision on the European Union’s Maastricht
Treaty. WESEL, supra note 4, at 297-302, 362-65. Kirchhof was the Reporter in these
cases, and his influence seemed particularly strong in his areas of expertise.
22
KOMMERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS, supra note 4, at 188-89. In the United States,
Chief Justice Marshall appears to have been able to exercise a similar unifying influence, particularly in the earlier years of his tenure when most decisions were unanimous and were announced in opinions written by the Chief Justice himself. Charles F.
Hobson, Defining the Office: John Marshall as Chief Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1421, 142631 (2006).
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President) of the Constitutional Court, with exceptional talents for
mediation, may continue to play an especially influential role in the
councils of his or her particular Senate.
IV. THE COURT’S SCREENING COMMITTEES
The role of the President of the Constitutional Court is also affected—and in this case perhaps somewhat enhanced—by an important difference in the procedure of decisionmaking in the Constitutional Court, in contrast with that of the Supreme Court of the United
States. This difference concerns the process of screening cases in the
Constitutional Court.
Each year litigants file more than five thousand Constitutional
Complaints asking the Court to invalidate a wide variety of govern23
mental actions. Of course, only a very small fraction of these Complaints can be decided in full Senate opinions. Yet the Court’s procedure still reflects the strongly held and perhaps quixotic view—dating
back to the era of the Court’s origins—that every person filing a Constitutional Complaint is, in principle, entitled to a decision on the
merits. Such a commitment has made it impossible, up until now, for
the Court to adopt a discretionary review system such as the certiorari
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States.
As a result, the overwhelming majority of decisions of the Constitutional Court are not rendered by a full Senate, but rather by threejudge committees (Kammern) whose task is to screen and decide most
24
of these Constitutional Complaints.
These screening committees
function in the following manner: if a committee finds that a Constitutional Complaint is clearly without merit—or if it is otherwise unacceptable on certain other grounds—the committee dismisses the
Complaint. If, in contrast, the committee finds that the Complaint is
clearly meritorious, it may issue a decision in favor of the complainant. In both kinds of cases, the committee’s decision must be unanimous, and it is unreviewable.
The opinions written by the committees may be summary in nature, but they can also be long and complex under some circumstances. These committee decisions are obviously less authoritative
than full Senate decisions, and they are ordinarily not included in the
official reports of the Constitutional Court. In important instances,

23
24

SCHLAICH & KORIOTH, supra note 12, at 59.
Id. at 58-59.
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however, these opinions are reprinted (in edited form) in German law
25
journals. It is only if a Constitutional Complaint falls in the gray area
between a clearly non-meritorious and a clearly meritorious claim that
the screening committee sends the Complaint to the full Senate for
additional screening and possible decision.
Thus, the screening committees of the German Constitutional
Court play a subsidiary, but nonetheless important, role in the development of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court. They indeed can play a substantive role in the development of doctrine—
unlike the certiorari procedure, which serves the function of screening cases in the Supreme Court of the United States.
There are usually three of these three-judge screening committees
in each of the two Senates of the Constitutional Court. “As there are
only eight judges on each Senate, it is clear that one judge in each
26
Senate must serve on two screening committees.” Invariably in recent years the President has served on two of the screening commit27
tees in his or her Senate. To this extent, then, the process of screening gives an additional vote in these committees to the President of
the Court, and therefore—to some perhaps unknowable degree—may
accord the President somewhat more influence in the decision of a
large number of Constitutional Complaints on this secondary level of
the Court’s adjudication.
On the other hand, in light of this increased committee work as
well as other important administrative duties, the President ends up
writing significantly fewer opinions as Reporter for the full Senate
28
than the average number written by the other judges. So to the extent that the Reporter has special influence over the decisions of the
full Senate, it could be the case that, in this respect, the President’s influence is somewhat diminished.

25

In addition, the initial volumes of a new series of reporters, reprinting selected
opinions of the screening committees, have recently appeared. 1-6 BVERFGK, KAMMERENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS. EINE AUSWAHL (Verein der
Richter des Bundesverfassungsgerichts ed., 2004-2006).
26
FILMER & SCHWAN, supra note 10, at 181. In a relatively small number of instances, the Second Senate has created four screening committees instead of three; in
such cases, of course, an additional number of judges must each sit on two screening
committees.
27
Id.; Geschäftsverteilung documents, 2000-2006 supra note 18; Geschäftsverteilung
documents 1990-1999 (on file with author).
28
FILMER & SCHWAN, supra note 10, at 183.
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V. AUTHORITY WITH RESPECT TO THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
The official title of the American Chief Justice is “Chief Justice of
the United States”—not, as it is sometimes stated, “Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court.” Whatever this appellation may have meant in earlier
periods, the American Chief Justice has assumed considerable responsibility not only for the administration of the Supreme Court, but as
leader of the federal judiciary in general. Thus, the Chief Justice prepares an annual report on the state of the federal judiciary, and is often an advocate before Congress for funding and resources, not only
for the Supreme Court but for all of the federal courts. Moreover, the
Chief Justice is chairman of the Judicial Conference of the United
29
States, a general governing body of the federal courts, and he has, or
has had, other statutory authority over aspects of the federal courts.
For example, the Chief Justice is authorized by statute to choose—
from among the federal judiciary—the judges who are to sit on the
special courts established by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
30
Act. Several commentators have argued that this collection of statutory authorities actually gives the Chief Justice an extended—and indeed inappropriate—degree of practical power, which may be exercised without the checks and limitations that are ordinarily present in
31
the more traditional aspects of the judicial function.
This sort of general judicial leadership role is largely absent in the
case of the President of the German Constitutional Court. Of course,
the President is the chief administrative officer of the Constitutional
Court itself, and he supervises its large corps of employees. Indeed,

29

The Judicial Conference was established by Congress at the urging of Chief Justice Taft, whose campaign to modernize the federal judiciary has been called his greatest accomplishment as Chief Justice. JOAN BISKUPIC & ELDER WITT, THE SUPREME
COURT AT WORK 92-93 (2d ed. 1997).
30
50 U.S.C. § 1803 (2000). Under the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, a statute
that is no longer in effect, the Chief Justice also had statutory authority to appoint the
members of a special court (known as the Special Division), which was to supervise the
work of “independent counsel” appointed under that Act. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.
654, 660-61 & n.3 (1988).
31
See, e.g., Theodore W. Ruger, The Judicial Appointment Power of the Chief Justice, 7
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 341, 390 (2004) (arguing that exclusive authority vested in the
Chief Justice to make appointments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance courts
and other special courts is “problematic,” because there is no way to “prevent the Chief
from exercising that power in a strategic way to affect outcomes”); Judith Resnik, The
Programmatic Judiciary: Lobbying, Judging, and Invalidating the Violence Against Women Act,
74 S. CAL. L. REV. 269, 285-88 (2000) (noting the “enormous influence” of the Chief
Justice in selecting committees of the Judicial Conference, which may in turn determine influential recommendations of the Conference to Congress).
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this administrative authority seems to extend to rather complete control over many matters of detail: “Most policies having to do with recruitment of nonjudicial personnel, allocation of secretarial assistance
and office facilities, provision and supervision of law clerks, decisions
on hours and conditions of work, purchase of books and supplies, and
the use of the Court’s transportation pool are made by the Presi32
dent.” The President also has the authority to appoint an official
called the Constitutional Court Director, who reports to the President
and exercises day-to-day responsibility over these administrative mat33
ters.
Yet, for important theoretical reasons, it is most unlikely that the
President of the Constitutional Court could have any general responsibility for any of the other German courts. The reasons for this striking contrast with the role of the American Chief Justice lead us into a
brief consideration of the nature of the German judiciary, as well as
the origins of the German Constitutional Court.
Taking a lead from the antijudicial ideology of the French Revolution, the states of Western Europe in the nineteenth century (including Germany) developed a view of judges that seemed rather distinct
from the view of common law judges that prevailed in the AngloAmerican world. The continental view emphasized the centrality of
the written law—the statutes or codes—and judges were often viewed
as quasi-bureaucrats who should be able to deliver syllogistic opinions
derived in a logical manner from the applicable rule of law and the
facts of the case. Under this view—perhaps realized more fully in
France than in Germany—the judges were to reason according to very
specific and narrowly defined techniques, in contrast with the (perhaps chaotic) creativity that could sometimes be expected in the
common law system.
Thus, when it came to the question of establishing a Constitutional Court—first in Austria in the 1920s, and later in Germany after
World War II—most experts believed that the new tribunal would be
called upon to hand down quasi-political decisions that would be fundamentally different in nature from the judgments issued by the
32

KOMMERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS, supra note 4, at 91-92. On the other hand, the
Court’s Plenum—the joint meeting of the two Senates—retains some authority over
more general administrative questions. BENDA & KLEIN, supra note 20, at 70.
33
KOMMERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS, supra note 4, at 92, 94-95; BENDA & KLEIN, supra
note 20, at 72. Indeed, the Director can be a very important official within the Court,
as exemplified, for example, by the career of Dr. Karl-Georg Zierlein (the Director under Roman Herzog), who was known as the Court’s “gray eminence.” FILMER &
SCHWAN, supra note 10, at 196-97.
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courts of the “ordinary” civil and criminal law. Moreover, it was
thought that years of immersion in the technical and narrowly legal
methods of the ordinary law were not likely to produce personalities
who would be able, when necessary, to confront and overrule actions
of the legislative or executive branches. Others thought—perhaps in
contradiction with the foregoing view—that the judges of the ordinary
law had been too forceful in asserting monarchist or right-wing positions against democratic governmental measures under the Weimar
34
Republic (1919-1933).
Therefore, following a pattern that had been developed by Hans
Kelsen in Austria in the 1920s, the German Constitutional Court was
basically established outside of the general legal system. Although the
Constitutional Court of course must have important points of contact
35
with the “ordinary” legal system, it is not a part of that system. For
example, the Constitutional Court, which is basically limited to the
decision of constitutional questions, has no power to set down authoritative interpretations of federal statutes or to decide any other
questions of the “ordinary” law.
Thus, the Constitutional Court is a court almost exclusively for
constitutional matters, which is placed outside of the system of the ordinary courts and the ordinary law—a position that contrasts substantially with that of the Supreme Court of the United States, which basically has jurisdiction not only over questions of constitutional law, but
also over all other questions of federal law. In this light, it would be a
sort of structural solecism for the President of the Constitutional
Court—the chief officer of a court that lies outside of the general
German judicial system—to be considered the head of the “ordinary”
German judiciary as well.
Moreover, there is another difference in the structure of the
German courts that would make such authority most unlikely if not
impossible. In contrast with the United States and its extensive system
of federal courts on the trial and appellate levels of adjudication,
there are actually very few federal courts in Germany. Indeed, with a
few minor exceptions, the only German “federal” courts are the five
“supreme courts” which are placed at the top of the five separate areas

34

KOMMERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS, supra note 4, at 75.
Rather, the system of “ordinary” law is divided up into five separate and parallel
court structures, which adjudicate five separate specialized legal areas. These five areas
are: (1) civil and criminal law; (2) employment law; (3) administrative law; (4) social
security law; and (5) tax law. At the top of each of these five systems is a federal supreme court which controls the interpretation of law in its specific area.
35
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36

of “ordinary” adjudication. The various levels of lower courts in all
of these five areas are state courts, directed by the state governments
and state ministries of justice—even though they are reviewed at the
top by the five federal “supreme courts,” and even though most of the
law that these state courts apply is federal law. That the lower courts
in all five areas are state courts parallels a broader principle of the
German constitutional system, which largely avoids administration of
law on the federal level. Rather, the administration of federal statutes
is largely undertaken by the states, and the creation of the lower
courts as state courts parallels this broader bureaucratic structure.
Thus, while the President of the German Constitutional Court is
the administrative chief of that court, his or her responsibility does
not ordinarily extend beyond that role into the other structures of the
German judiciary. It is perhaps in this characteristic that the more
modest nature of the office of the President of the German Constitutional Court—in contrast with that of the American Chief Justice—is
most readily apparent.
VI. INFORMAL INFLUENCE INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE COURT
Yet probably the most important role of the President of the German Constitutional Court—and perhaps that of the Chief Justice of
the United States, as well—lies in the opportunities for informal influence both within the Court and outside of the Court. On the one
hand, of course, the institution of unsigned majority opinions (as well
as assignment in accordance with expertise) will deprive the President
of the German Constitutional Court of the possibility of signaling particularly important decisions by virtue of his or her authorship. In this
way, the President loses the representative possibilities exploited so
fully by American Chief Justices, such as Chief Justice Marshall in numerous opinions for the Court, Chief Justice Warren in Brown v. Board
37
38
of Education and Reynolds v. Sims, Chief Justice Burger in United
39
States v. Nixon, and (to take a disastrous example) Chief Justice
40
Taney in Dred Scott v. Sandford. Moreover—in part because of the
practice of unsigned majority opinions, and in part because of the

36

See supra note 35. Of course, the Federal Constitutional Court itself is also a
“federal” court.
37
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
38
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
39
418 U.S. 683 (1974).
40
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
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general nature of legal and social culture in Germany—the judges of
the German Constitutional Court (including the President) are generally not nearly as well known in Germany as their counterparts on
the Supreme Court are known in the United States.
On the other hand, as we have seen, the institution of unsigned
majority opinions may yield pressures within the Court that give the
President particular scope (within one Senate, at least) for the exercise of mediating powers, if he or she has—as President HöpkerAschoff apparently had—a “genius” in the skills of mediation.
From time to time in the history of the Constitutional Court,
moreover, the President of the Court has played an important representative role in public controversies concerning the Court, and in
struggles with other political forces. In certain of these instances, the
representative role of the Court’s President seems to have, if anything,
exceeded similar activities by the Chief Justice of the United States.
Let us focus on two important examples of this phenomenon.
In the early 1950s—almost at the outset of its existence—the Constitutional Court was engaged in a political struggle with the Adenauer
government over issues having to do with the constitutionality of a
proposed plan for integrating European military forces. At the same
time, the Court was embroiled with the Federal Justice Ministry over
the hotly contested question of whether the Constitutional Court
should be treated as a separate “constitutional organ”—on the level of
the federal government, the federal parliament, and the federal President—or whether, on the contrary, it should be administratively
treated as just another court, subject to the budgetary and other su41
pervision of the Ministry of Justice.
In these disputes, the Court’s first President, Hermann HöpkerAschoff, played a significant role through public debate and internal
governmental pressure. Indeed, President Höpker-Aschoff informed
Chancellor Adenauer and Federal President Heuss that he would resign if a particularly hostile Justice Minster, who had bitterly attacked
the Court, were reappointed to the cabinet—and the Justice Minister
was not reappointed. In the end, the Court “very adroitly survived the

41

For discussion of these controversies, see WESEL, supra note 4, at 54-82; KOMnote 4, at 83-86, 282-86. The theoretical underpinnings
of the Court’s position on the question of its status rested on a memorandum written
principally by the eminent law professor and Constitutional Court judge, Gerhard
Leibholz. WESEL, supra note 4, at 78-79; see also Gerhard Leibholz, Der Status des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts, in DAS BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT: 1951-1971, at 31-57
(1971) (setting forth Leibholz’s views on the status question).
MERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS, supra
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crisis [over the European military force] and solidified its esteem
42
among the public” through the independence of its judgments. In
that crisis, “the judges stood solidly together with their President
[Höpker-Aschoff] who represented, with great dignity, the independ43
ence of the Court.”
Another extraordinary effort of a Constitutional Court President
in seeking to protect the Court as an institution—on this occasion,
against widespread public attack, rather than against internal government maneuvering—was strikingly evident during the recent tenure
of Constitutional Court President Jutta Limbach. In 1994 and 1995,
almost at the outset of Limbach’s term of office, the Court handed
down a number of decisions that infuriated important conservative
groups in Germany. For example, the Court found that many East
44
German spies were immune from prosecution in unified Germany;
that public references to soldiers as “murderers” often constituted
45
protected speech; that antimissile sit-down protestors could not be
constitutionally punished under a statute whose language had been
46
drastically extended to achieve that end; and that crucifixes could
not constitutionally be placed in public school classrooms over the ob47
jection of parents or students. Although some of these results might
have seemed unexceptionable in American constitutional law, they
were surprising to many German citizens. In any case, perhaps as a
result of the strong protection of minority interests reflected in these
cases, and perhaps because of the Court’s apparent devaluation of
traditional German institutions such as the army and the church,
these decisions evoked an unprecedented public attack on the institu-

42

WESEL, supra note 4, at 74-75.
Id. at 75. This effective defense of the independence of the Constitutional
Court within the councils of government may be comparable to the letter written by
Chief Justice Hughes to an influential senator for the purpose of combating President
Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan by denying the necessity of additional Justices. ROBERT
J. STEAMER, CHIEF JUSTICE: LEADERSHIP AND THE SUPREME COURT 58-59 (1986). At a
considerably earlier period, Chief Justice Marshall sent a letter to House Speaker
Henry Clay, which had a similar purpose and a similar result. Hobson, supra note 22,
at 1457.
44
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 15,
1995, 92 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 277 (F.R.G.).
45
BVerfG, Oct. 10, 1995, 93 BVerfGE 266.
46
BVerfG, Jan. 10, 1995, 92 BVerfGE 1.
47
BVerfG, May 16, 1995, 93 BVerfGE 1.
43
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tion of the Constitutional Court. Indeed, according to some, this was
48
the “greatest crisis” of the Court’s history.
In response to this wave of criticism, President Limbach launched
into a vigorous round of discussions and interviews with important national journals such as the Spiegel magazine, as well as other representatives of the German media. In these discussions, Limbach sought to
elucidate the nuanced nature of the controversial decisions which, in
her view, were not as extreme as the critics had maintained. More
generally, she sought to explain the importance of the independence
of the judiciary in a liberal republic. The fact that most of the controversial decisions had been issued by the First Senate—the Senate on
which President Limbach did not sit—may have made her defense of
the Court even more persuasive.
After a year or so, the crisis passed, and the Court reassumed its
position of highest esteem among the political organs of the Federal
Republic. Many commentators credited President Limbach, in sig49
nificant part, for this result. But even thereafter, President Limbach
continued to maintain a heavy schedule of discussions and television
appearances on issues relating to the Constitutional Court. Overall, in
her defense and representation of the Court, President Limbach displayed a willingness to engage in extrajudicial discussion and explanation that went considerably beyond anything of the sort that has been
50
seen in a Chief Justice of the United States—in recent times at least.
CONCLUSION
A comparison of relevant aspects of the German and American
constitutional tribunals shows that differences in the structures of the

48

DECKENBACH, supra note 12, at 181. For a detailed discussion of these cases and
the Constitutional Court crisis of 1995, see Peter E. Quint, The Pershing Missile Protests: Civil Disobedience and the German Constitutional Court, ch. V (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author). For President Limbach’s reflections on the crisis, see
JUTTA LIMBACH, “IM NAMEN DES VOLKES”: MACHT UND VERANTWORTUNG DER RICHTER
165-201 (1999).
49
DECKENBACH, supra note 12, at 192. For the purpose of creating a more permanent institution, Limbach established the Court’s Press Office (Pressestelle), which
would have the task, among others, of preparing explanatory press releases for constitutional decisions. Id. at 186-87.
50
Id. at 181-86, 194, 207-08. In what may have been a unique effort—unparalleled
in Germany as in the United States—Chief Justice Marshall wrote an anonymous defense of McCulloch v. Maryland, which was published in a Virginia newspaper and sent
to influential political figures in Virginia. Hobson, supra note 22, at 1446; JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969).
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two courts yield differences in the comparative power and authority of
the chief judicial officers of those courts—the Chief Justice of the
United States and the President of the German Constitutional Court.
For the most part, relevant structural characteristics of the German Constitutional Court seem to limit the authority of the President’s role in comparison with that of the American Chief Justice. For
example, the division of the Constitutional Court into two separate
Senates (in comparison with the “one Supreme Court”) decreases the
influence of the President over certain internal functions of the
Court. Moreover, the limitation of the German justices’ terms of office to a maximum of twelve years significantly curtails the President’s
opportunity for long-term exercise of influence, in comparison with
the opportunities open to the American Chief Justice with his lifetime
tenure. In addition, the President’s quite limited control over the assignment of the Court’s opinions (and the unsigned nature of those
opinions) greatly reduces a source of influence that is possessed by
the American Chief Justice—although a President with skills as a mediator may still exercise some special influence within his or her own
Senate. Finally, the President of the Constitutional Court is not
placed at the head of an extended federal judiciary, in contrast with
the role of the Chief Justice of the United States; accordingly, the possibly questionable accumulation of power that some commentators
have seen in this aspect of the Chief Justice’s role does not seem to be
present in Germany.
On the other hand, the President of the German Constitutional
Court may gain some advantage by ordinarily being placed on two of
the Court’s screening committees (whereas other justices ordinarily sit
on only one committee), but this advantage may be counterbalanced
by the President’s diminished opportunity to be the primary drafter
(Reporter) of the Court’s majority opinions.
Yet a significant part of this deficit may be made up by the President’s representative role—a role also played by the Chief Justice of
the United States. Indeed, in certain instances, the President has
played an important political role—either warding off incursions from
other parts of the government, or making use of broad access to publicity in television and national journals to defend against public attacks on the Court and to further the Court’s acceptance among the
public. On significant occasions, the President has exercised this role
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with a vigor that seems to have gone rather significantly beyond any
representative functions of this type that have been exercised, in recent decades at least, by the Chief Justice of the United States.
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APPENDIX
THE EIGHT PRESIDENTS OF THE GERMAN
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT (1951-2006)
1. Hermann Höpker-Aschoff, President 1951-1954. Höpker-Aschoff,
the first President of the German Constitutional Court, had been an
eminent Prussian finance minister and a Member of Parliament under
51
the Weimar Republic. After World War II, he became an important
member of the Parliamentary Council, which drafted the German Basic Law, and, in accordance with his fiscal experience, he was active in
52
work on the financial provisions of the constitution. Thereafter, he
became a leader of the Free Democratic Party (FDP), which joined
53
the center-right coalition government under Chancellor Adenauer.
In his work as President of the Court, Höpker-Aschoff may not
have been an eminent legal technician, but he was regarded as a “gen54
ius” in achieving unanimity among the justices. Moreover, as a matter of style, he was less interested in “the niceties of constitutional interpretation” than in “a decision that was supported by common
55
sense.” In sum, Höpker-Aschoff was highly esteemed by his fellow
judges, and he was a strong leader who protected the Court against
56
political attack.
2. Josef Wintrich, President 1954-1958. Before coming to the
Court, Wintrich had been a professor and judge in Munich, and he
had played a central role in the development of the Constitutional
Court of Bavaria, the first state constitutional court to be created in
57
Germany after World War II. Wintrich was a “scholarly . . . man of
culture and refinement, [and] one of Germany’s most respected ju51

G.W., Der Präsident des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 7 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHEN544, 545 (1954).
52
Id.; EDMUND SPEVACK, ALLIED CONTROL AND GERMAN FREEDOM 295, 376
(2001); KOMMERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS, supra note 4, at 124.
53
KOMMERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS, supra note 4, at 123-24.
54
Id. at 189.
55
Konrad Zweigert, Duktus der Rechtsprechung des ersten Senats des Bundesverfassungsgerichts und einige Erinnerungen an seine Anfangszeit, in DAS BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT, supra note 41, at 95, 116.
56
KOMMERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS, supra note 4, at 124, 189; WESEL, supra note 4, at
54-82; see also Theodor Ritterspach, Erinnerungen an die Anfänge des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, in GRUNDRECHTE, SOZIALE ORDNUNG UND VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT:
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR ERNST BENDA ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 201, 203 (Eckart Klein ed., 1995)
(noting the exemplary qualities of Höpker-Aschoff as President).
57
Alfons Goppel, Zum Gedenken an Josef Wintrich, 14 JURISTENZEITUNG [JZ] 186,
187 (1959); G.W., supra note 51, at 544.
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58

rists.” But he seems to have been a rather ineffectual Constitutional
Court President. It has been said, for example, that he “had a Hamletlike tendency toward indecision” in the Communist Party dissolution
case, which was probably the most important case considered during
59
his tenure.
Indeed, Wintrich apparently approached Chancellor
Adenauer and urged him to withdraw the government’s complaint
60
against the Communist Party—a step that Adenauer refused to take.
As a scholar, Wintrich was a prominent exponent of the view that
certain constitutional principles were so fundamental that they could
not even be altered by constitutional amendment—a view that con61
trasted sharply with the prevailing German positivism of earlier eras.
Wintrich died after serving only four and a half years of his tenure as
Constitutional Court President.
3. Gebhard Müller, President 1959-1971. In the early years of his
legal career, Gebhard Müller was a trial court judge (Amtsrichter) during the Weimar Republic and under the Nazis, and he became an official in the judicial bureaucracy at the outset of the occupation pe62
riod. Soon after the war ended, however, he turned his attention to
politics, and he held a number of important positions in state government and in the newly formed political party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). In 1953, Müller became Minister-President
(governor) of the southwestern German State of Baden-Württemberg,
which had recently been created from three separate states of the oc63
cupation period. After five years as governor during a politically difficult period, Müller accepted his appointment as President of the
64
Constitutional Court, apparently with a sense of relief.

58

KOMMERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS, supra note 4, at 133; G.W., supra note 51, at 544-

45.
59

KOMMERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS, supra note 4, at 134.
Id. at 190-91; WESEL, supra note 4, at 90-91.
61
Goppel, supra note 57, at 187-88; cf. Josef Wintrich, Rechtsidee und Verfassungsrichtertum, 9 JZ 454, 455 (1954) (reprinting Wintrich’s speech upon induction as Constitutional Court President, which argued that the Basic Law adopted “dignity of the person” and “equality before the law” as “principles of constitutional law . . . with absolute
validity”).
62
Kurt Hochstuhl, Lebensziel Amtsrichter? Anmerkungen zur Biographie Gebhard
Müllers bis 1945, in GEBHARD MÜLLER: EIN LEBEN FÜR DAS RECHT UND DIE POLITIK 9,
12-17 (Gerhard Taddey ed., 2000).
63
Klaus-Jürgen Matz, Gebhard Müller als erster Oppositionsführer und zweiter Ministerpräsident im neuen Südweststaat 1952-1958, in GEBHARD MÜLLER: EIN LEBEN FÜR DAS
RECHT UND DIE POLITIK, supra note 62, at 61, 62.
64
Id. at 62-63, 70.
60

2006]

PERSPECTIVES FROM GERMANY

1875

As President of the Constitutional Court, Müller was an excellent
administrator, and he worked diligently to reduce the Court’s backlog
65
of cases. During his period on the Court, Müller took some decidedly conservative positions, both with respect to the Court as an institution and also on points of doctrine. He resisted, for example, the
66
introduction of dissenting opinions in 1970, and it appears that he
generally favored interests of “community norms and moral values”
over those of freedom of speech, while he criticized particular types of
67
social security as unduly statist. After his retirement, Müller was ap68
pointed Honorary Professor at the University of Tübingen.
4. Ernst Benda, President 1971-1983. A member of parliament’s
influential judiciary committee, Benda was regarded as the preeminent legal theorist in the CDU; he first came to prominence with a
stirring parliamentary speech warning that a statute of limitations
threatened to put an end to prosecutions of Nazi atrocities—a speech
69
that did not necessarily please the leaders of his conservative party.
As Federal Interior Minister (1968-1969) in the so-called “Grand
Coalition,” Benda was the chief architect of the emergency laws of
1968, which many feared heralded a return to possible authoritarian70
ism in Germany.
Yet on the Constitutional Court, Benda also espoused more libertarian positions; he was a key supporter, for example, of an important Constitutional Court decision that struck down
71
an intrusive census law as a violation of rights of privacy. In sum, he
was “too far right for those on the left, but too far left for many on the
72
right.” As the first President in office after separate opinions of the
justices were introduced, Benda made use of this possibility only once
73
in his career.

65

Walter Rudi Wand, Gebhard Müller 80 Jahre, 35 JZ 280, 281 (1980); Helmut
Engler, Der Präsident des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 1959-1972, in GEBHARD MÜLLER: EIN
LEBEN FÜR DAS RECHT UND DIE POLITIK, supra note 62, at 71, 77.
66
Engler, supra note 65, at 76-77; KOMMERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS, supra note 4, at
194; supra note 17 and accompanying text.
67
KOMMERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS, supra note 4, at 153-54.
68
Wand, supra note 65, at 281.
69
KOMMERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS, supra note 4, at 143; Helmut Simon, Ernst Benda
zum 70. Geburtstag, 120 ARCHIV DES ÖFFENTLICHEN RECHTS 138, 138 (1995).
70
See generally ERNST BENDA, DER RECHTSSTAAT IN DER KRISE 76-107 (1972) (setting forth Benda’s defense of the emergency laws).
71
WESEL, supra note 4, at 216.
72
Simon, supra note 69, at 139 (quoting R. Reifenrath).
73
Konrad Hesse, Skepsis und Zuversicht, in Klein, supra note 56, at 1, 5.
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After his twelve-year Court term expired at the relatively early age
of fifty-eight, Benda became a professor of public law at the University
74
of Freiburg.
Always deeply interested in American law, Benda included this comparative topic prominently in his seminars in
Freiburg, and he spent time in the United States as a Fellow at the
75
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington.
5. Wolfgang Zeidler, Vice President 1975-1983; President 1983-1987.
A founder of the student branch of the Social Democratic Party
(SPD), Wolfgang Zeidler served as a law clerk at the Constitutional
Court and then became a judge in the civil and administrative courts;
he was also active in the administration of the government of Ham76
burg. Zeidler was first elected a justice of the Constitutional Court
in 1967, but he left in 1970 to take up the post of President of the Federal Administrative Court, one of the five “supreme courts” of the
general judiciary. In 1975 he was reelected to the Constitutional
Court as Vice President, and he became President in 1983.
Although Zeidler was elected to the Court as a candidate of the
SPD—and, indeed, was the first Social Democrat to be chosen President of the Court—he often voted with the conservative side in impor77
tant political cases throughout his career as President. Zeidler strove
for compromise and issued only one separate opinion (a concur78
rence) in his years on the Court.
Early in his career, Zeidler had spent a year as Research Fellow at
the Harvard Law School, and he was noted for his internationalism
and his interest in Anglo-American law. Zeidler died in a mountaineering accident in 1987.
6. Roman Herzog, Vice President 1983-1987; President 1987-1994.
At the outset of his career, Roman Herzog was a law professor in Berlin and Speyer and the coauthor of a well-known multi-volume commentary on the German Constitution. He then entered political life,
ascending to the office of Interior Minister in the State of BadenWürttemberg, from which he was elected to the Constitutional Court.
Although Herzog had taken a very hard line against anti-nuclear
demonstrators as Interior Minister in Baden-Württemberg, as a Con74

MENZEL, supra note 8, at 665.
Hesse, supra note 73, at 2, 9.
76
Most of the biographical material in this section is drawn from Walther Fürst et
al., Geleitwort, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR WOLFGANG ZEIDLER xv, xv-xix (Walther Fürst et al.
eds., 1987).
77
WESEL, supra note 4, at 215-16.
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Fürst et al., supra note 76, at xvi.
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2006]

PERSPECTIVES FROM GERMANY

1877

stitutional Court judge he was an important supporter of the Court’s
Brokdorf opinion, which established broad protections for demonstra79
tions under the Basic Law. Herzog presided over a number of important cases arising from German unification, including a controversial decision upholding a rule excluding large tracts of land
expropriated by the Soviet occupation regime from a general pro80
gram of returning confiscated property. As a matter of style, President Herzog took particular care to achieve strong majority votes, and
he never issued a dissenting or concurring opinion in his years on the
81
Constitutional Court.
Herzog’s term on the Court was cut short by his election, in 1994,
to the office of President of the Federal Republic of Germany.
7. Jutta Limbach, President 1994-2002. In a career path similar to
that of Roman Herzog, Jutta Limbach was a law professor who entered
82
government and was thereafter elected to the Constitutional Court.
A long-time professor of law and the sociology of law at the Free University of Berlin, Limbach became Attorney General ( J ustizsenator) in
the state government of West Berlin, shortly before German unification. As Attorney General, she showed notable vigor in the prosecution of East German officials (including former East German dictator
Erich Honecker) for actions such as the use of deadly force against
people attempting to flee across the Berlin Wall. She also acted to
prevent East Berlin judges, who may have been implicated in the injustices of the old regime, from continuing in office without a stringent review and evaluation of their records. Her role as Attorney
General in Berlin made her well known throughout the Federal Republic.
On the Court, Judge Limbach dissented in a significant decision
on the rights of political asylum, and she and other judges dissented
from the prevailing view in an important case on the deployment of
German forces under the NATO Treaty. But her tenure was particularly notable for her vigorous public defense of the Constitutional
Court in unprecedented controversies over unpopular Court decisions, and her defense of the Court is said to have been important in
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WESEL, supra note 4, at 216, 217; see also FILMER & SCHWAN, supra note 10, at
184-85.
80
See FILMER & SCHWAN, supra note 10, at 187-88.
81
Id. at 194-95. This means, of course, that Herzog never issued a signed opinion
during his tenure on the Court.
82
Most of the biographical material in this section is drawn from DECKENBACH,
supra note 12.
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protecting the institution from serious political damage. Limbach
also established the Press Office of the Constitutional Court in an attempt to promote greater understanding of the Court’s work among
the German public.
8. Hans-Jürgen Papier, Vice President 1998-2002; President 2002present. Hans-Jürgen Papier began his legal career as a professor of
public law in Bielefeld and Munich. After German unification, he was
appointed to lead a government commission which investigated the
origins of property held by the Communist Party of East Germany and
made influential recommendations for its disposition. Papier was
elected to the Constitutional Court as Vice President in 1998 and be84
came President upon the retirement of Jutta Limbach in 2002.
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Id. at 192.
Menzel, supra note 8, at 670; Résumé of Hans-Jürgen Papier, http://
www.bverfg.de/richter/papier.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2006).
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